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BOOK REVIEW
POWER,

CORRUPTION AND RECTITUDE. By Arnold Rogow and Harold D. Lass-

well; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Pp. 138. $6.00.
This is a highly challenging book by two well known political scientists.
Their challenge is to a proposition which, they say, has been too long accepted
as stating a self-evident truth: namely, the proposition which asserts, in the
formulation of Lord Acton, that "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely." The writing of this book would have needed no further
justification, of course, than to demand proof beyond what is held to be selfevident before acknowledging the validity of any such proposition; indeed, the
(science" component in political science suggests not only a justification but an
obligation for this kind of undertaking. Accordingly, those political scientists
who associate themselves with what has been recently a strong movement to
strengthen the scientific component of their discipline have been insisting that
the putative truths of conventional wisdom, hallowed as they may have become
through reaffirmation by many generations of sage statesmen, philosophers and
scholars, be made to prove themselves viable in the harsh environment of
scientific inquiry as well. It is not startling, then, to find Professors Rogow
and Lasswell, who both are decidedly of the behavioral-scientific persuasion
within their discipline, bluntly impugning the adequacy of the intellectual
technique by which Acton's proposition was derived, even as they challenge its
validity. But concerned as they are with truth, no less are the authors concerned with consequences. The first thrust of their challenge is directed, indeed,
not to the intrinsic truth or falsity of the Acton principle, but to an attempt to
demonstrate that, valid or invalid, its "dogmatic acceptance" has had deplorable consequences for democratic politics. And later, in expounding their own
intellectual technique, which they term a "contextual method," they stress
particularly that it has usefulness not only as an analytic tool by which to test
the validity of the Acton principle, but also as an approach through which, for
the purpose of improving the condition of democratic politics, it should be
possible to develop a "strategy of action designed to reconcile power and
rectitude ..

We in the United States, Professors Lasswell and Rogow contend, by our
unquestioning acceptance of the Acton dogma as truth, and particularly by our
uncritical adherence to certain institutional arrangements which are highly
responsive to its warning, have seriously hindered government from being responsive, as well, to our needs. Because, they argue, we have had fastened upon
us a conviction that safety from the abuses of power can only be found in the
separation-of-powers, check-and-balance scheme of constitutionalism that the
founders (who feared power almost as much as they feared anarchy) devised,
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we have failed, perhaps, to appreciate that the power, the effective use of which
we are thus depriving ourselves, is, after all, our own. "In an age of democracy,"
they would remind us, "a fear of government is, in essence, a fear of the
majority based on a fear of the self. In the modern day of self-government the
real meaning of 'power tends to corrupt . . .' is not that 'the rulers may be corrupt,' but 'I am corrupt,' and the reality of separation of powers is 'I must
be divided against myself.'"
It is of course true that the familiar stigmata of American constitutionalism-the vertical distribution of powers in the federal system, their separation
horizontally, the intricate system of checks and balances, both vertical and
horizontal-are all reflective of the framers' conviction that among those who
govern "ambition must be made to counteract ambition." But their mistrust
of men in power was only an extension of their dour estimate of the nature of
man generally. They were not, most of them, among those "children of light"
of the eighteenth century who believed in the perfectibility of the human race.
Carl Becker has the Philosophes looking enviously across the water to what they
supposed was "the unspoiled innocence of an Arcadian civilization that flourished
in Pennsylvania." But if there was innocence abroad in the vicinity, it did not
suffuse the Philadelphia Convention Hall. The men there were not Arcadians.
They were, as Richard Hofstadter describes them, "men of affairs, merchants,
lawyers, planter-businessmen, speculators. They had seen human nature on
display in the market-place, the courtroom, the legislative chamber, and in
every secret path and alleyway where wealth and power are counted." Add to
this composite experience the influence of an intellectual heritage in which
Calvinistic religion and Hobbesian secular philosophy, at the farthest opposite
reaches of the intellectual universe in some respects, were agreed at least on
the egotistical, heedless and downright anti-social character of man left to
himself. Taking such influences into account it is not startling that in the
Convention and in the discourse surrounding ratification, terms of reference
employed in relation to human nature were "depravity," "avarice," "love of
money," "love of power," "predominant thirst for power," "rapaciousness,"
"vindictiveness," "folly and wickedness." Even Benjamin Franklin, identified
by Becker as being, with Jefferson, a true American child of the Enlightenment,
and certainly a friend to men everywhere, observed to the Convention that
"there are two passions which have a powerful influence in the affairs of men.
These are ambition and avarice; the love of power and the love of money."
Why this amount of attention to the views of the founders on human
nature generally? Because the power of men generally was a matter very much
in the forefront of their concern. The will of the people was, after all, the base
from which they had to build, and they were committed to the principle that
the broad directing power, at least, must be kept in the people's hands. But
how should this power be channelized; at what points brought directly to
bear? And how should the rights of the lesser numbers be protected from the
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overwhelming will of the greater? Given their perceptions about the character
of men generally (however strongly these may have been affected by experience,
by intellectual inheritance, and, ! la Beardian history, by their own motives,
conscious or unconscious, of self-interest-cf. Madison's own theory of the
nature of attitude formation, in Federalist No. 10), the tendency of their
response to these questions seems, with the benefit of hindsight, to have been
an obvious one. As with persons holding office, so with the people in their
constituent capacity, forestall propensities to the abusive or excessive exercise
of power by devising a system on the principle that for them too, "ambition must
be made to counteract ambition." This involved, as noted above, a vertical distribution of powers in the Federal system, as well as a horizontal separation on
the plane of national government, and it also involved a complicated set of
relationships between various parts of government and their constituencies,
operating in general to minimize the number of points at which direct constituency power could be brought to bear (e.g., the original electoral college
scheme, and the appointment of United States Senators by state legislators)
and especially to forestall large homogeneous constituencies from bringing
power directly to bear at any" one point. This was the framers' way of achieving a "balanced constitution" in the ancient sense, the internal separation of
powers being only part of the larger design-albeit an important one, and a
highly strategic one because it had appeal on other grounds as well. Professors
Lasswell and Rogow explain this:
The formula of separation of powers appealed to the different interests
of the time for different reasons. Those who conceived of government
as a necessary enemy of majority liberty thought the formula would
sufficiently constrain government to permit freedom. The principle of
separation was especially acceptable to those who were more concerned
with the problem of tyranny through government as a result of a
future increase in the suffrage leading to majority rule. From this
point of view a divided government was better able to cope with the
'tyranny of the majority' than a unified government system.
Now this is about the clearest statement we have from the authors
recognizing that the frequent frustrations of majority will that they impute to
the operation of the separation-of-powers, check-and-balance system h~s not
been simply a result of unforeseen difficulties in its operation, but rather a
tribute to the durability of the founders' deliberate contrivance. The question
of the framers' intention is of some importance to the development of the
Lasswell-Rogow argument from this point on, because the primary bad consequence that they attribute to the separation of powers scheme in operation, as
a product of the founders' acting upon the Acton premise, is precisely that it
hinders democratic, majority rule. This, they assert, results from, among other
things, the manner in which power separation (at both national and state levels)
has weakened the political parties-a thesis that has also been argued recently
by James M. Burns, in his Deadlock of Democracy. On the administrative
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side of government, the traditions of power separation and the thinking that
underlies it has led, as government has expanded, they observe, to a haphazard
multiplication of agencies, sometimes so set up, like the independent regulatory
commissions, as to diffuse responsibility as well as powers, and make any
concerted leadership or control in terms of either accountability or coordination
with larger policy objectives extremely difficult. Whether in fact we could sweep
away such hinderances to majority rule as are placed there by the separation
of powers, and other power-braking devices within our system, without subjecting ourselves, in the field of civil liberties for example, to the dangers of
majority tyranny, is an issue which the authors do not squarely confront, much
less satisfactorily resolve. "Paradoxically," as they see it, the non-elected
judicial branch in recent years has done more for the establishment of basic
minority rights, political and civil, than has the popularly elected legislative
branch, and in a footnote, they do observe that the present role of the Supreme
Court in behalf of civil rights and against McCarthyite legislation "is a
reminder that the Court's power to check majorities have [sic] served the
forces of progress as well as those of reaction." Curiously, they then remark
that "the view of the Court as undemocratic, which is still current in some
quarters, reflects Jeffersonian views and the manifest opposition of the Court
to the regulatory movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." Well, surely by their own test, cited earlier, the question whether the
Court is functioning as a proper agent of democracy is not to be resolved in
terms of what majority-backed legislation is happens to sustain and what it
happens to strike down, or interpret away into innocuity. Only by making a
much clearer differentiation than they appear willing to do elsewhere between
"democracy" and "majority rule" could such a resolution based upon the
content of the Court's decisions be consistently obtained by them.
II
A second part of the book is devoted to examining through a "contextual
approach" the validity of the Acton principle. This involves "considering the
behavior of the power-possessing individuals and institutions the principle
describes." Do individuals who seek power tend to be corrupted by the quest;
what kinds of individuals do seek it, for what purposes, and how do they,
respectively, behave with it after they have got some to exercise? What sorts
of persons reject power for its own sake, or subject themselves to its loss rather
than compromise a principle? Does absolute power corrupt absolutely? For the
answers the authors employ first a biographical test. The last item, regarding
absolute power, is approached first. Being an unqualified statement predictive
of an absolute result, the test for it is rather an obvious one. Is there any
absolute-power holder in history for whom there is evidence that he was not
corrupted absolutely? Yes. Marcus Aurelius is one. As a matter of fact, he was
an outstanding rectitude figure and it is notable that he voluntarily shared the
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power of his throne with others, indeed even insisted on such an arrangement. An
indication, possibly, that Marcus was himself an Actonian, worried that left
alone he would fall prey to the temptations of absolute power?
Other biographical tests at the "tendency" level result in further defeats
for Acton. Using here the materials of American political history and biography, the authors are led to conclude that the putative corruptive tendency
of power linked to the insatiability of the appetite for it, and the use of it to
gain more of it, even if not for other selfish advantage, simply is not born out
by analysis. "Indeed," they say, "it is tempting to argue that in American
political history power has tended more to ennoble than to corrupt those who
have sought and held it." Three figures on the national stage whose careers
they regard as tending to disprove Acton are Chester Arthur, Martin Van
Buren and Aaron Burr. The first they cite as an examaple of purification, if not
quite ennoblement, through coming into power; the second as an example of a
man who did for a long period assiduously pursue power, but kept his quest
free from unscrupulousness, ruthlessness or corruption, and who, gaining the
Presidency, did not then sacrifice to opportunism all adherence to principle. The
point of Burr's case is obscure. The authors apparently selected it because Burr
is one of the few American figures of prominence of whom it has been at least
alleged that his thirst for power led him to desperate means; their finding is
that he did not resort to such extreme measures to gratify his ambition as he
might have, and that even his role in the so-called Burr conspiracy does not
justify an Actonian interpretation.
More ambitious is the Rogow-Lasswell attempt to construct a typology of
political personalities on the basis of biographical material on some thirty state
and local political bosses. From their analysis of such materials the authors
find they can be divided essentially into two political types-the game politician and the gain politician. They aver, of course, that those are composites,
but they specify, perhaps, a few too many details for optimum verisimilitude.
Isn't it a bit too pat that the game politician, from early-American upper-class
stock, should have been as a boy tall, frail, frequently ill, and subject to rigorous
discipline from a stern, unbending father-a figure to the life from Riesman's
inner-directed household. His mother, though she loved him, did not interfere
in the painful sessions between father and lad, fearing to increase her husband's
wrath. In later life she became quite religious, and she also suffered a good deal
from psychosomatic illness. The game politician was not, in short, a happy
boy from a happy home; his political compensation was the ego reward derived
from having a central role in the game. The strategy was more important than
the issue, the victory more important than the substance of the outcome. The
gain politician, grown from a strong broth of a boy whose physical prowess was
needed in the rough neighborhood in which he was raised as the favorite son
of a fortunately strong and capable mother (for she was early widowed), is
similarly, alas, as presented, more of cardboard figure than an ideal-type.
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Another method that the authors use in their contextual approach is the
institutional test. What conditions of institutional life foster rectitude; in
what situation are the tendencies toward corruption most likely to be evident?
Their systematization here is valuable, and they do real damage to the Acton
thesis in showing that actually, in the American experience, high-prestige and
highly power-charged institutions like the Presidency and the Supreme Court
have evidenced great immunity from corruption (though, as they note, in the
White House, near the center, venality has been something of a problem),
whereas "institutions declining in power and prestige are more likely to attract
corrupt men interested in promoting their personal fortunes" by exploiting what
power-potential their office still possesses. The institution of Congress, though,
is an especially troublesome one to deal with in these terms, perhaps because
the periods of vigor and decline in its institutional life are not so readily specified. Its prestige and power have been, for some time at least, rated really
only vis-h-vis the President, but that relationship is not necessarily always
of two on a see-saw. On the whole, though, as the authors point out, there
has been a slackness in both houses toward corrupt behavior within the family.
This hurts Congress' moral position, of course, in those of its surveillance
functions which involve setting standards, and making determinations based
upon them, concerning the maintenance of rectitude elsewhere in the government.
III
Having reached, through their contextual critique of Acton, the conclusion
that power itself is neutral, that the quest for it or the exercise of it do not lead
either necessarily to corruption or to ennoblement, Professors Lasswell and
Rogow do not yet rest. Instead, they take up a challenge "to devise procedures by which the specific combinations responsible for fluctuations of
power and rectitude can be identified;" and further, to identify "policy moves,
conducted by appropriate strategies," which would, if attempted, influence a
pattern of development in which performance according to rectitude standards
would be maximized and corruption minimized. This is a larger order, and
the authors fully recognize it. But with considerable courage they attempt to
work out, nevertheless, the outlines of a general model. They are concerned,
for example, with the relationship between corruption and social change as one
factor-combination. The significant question, they suggest is: "Under what
conditions does change foster corruption or rectitude?" Is it when change
produces confusion about norms, when old value perspectives continue to be
applied to new situations? If so, the problem is to forestall confusion by
clarifying the norms in the context of the new situation. Again, confusion about
norms may exist across class, ethnic and social lines, where the absence of
universality of outlook is accompanied by behavior in one group according to
its norms that evokes a sense of outrage among persons differently situated.
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Take gambling, prohibition, or some of the types of behavior surveyed in the
Kinsey report.
Some of the authors' predictions of trend are disquieting. They forecast
that, as a means of combatting corrupt behavior in the society, law enforcement authorities will progressively extend the use of new techniques for
penetrating privacy. Traditional regard for privacy, they point out, has already been much abridged; however, they do offer the comfort that while its
protection is a losing cause, it will not be "completely" abandoned. But the
computer revolution, they suggest, opens new vistas of surveillance, both
within the business community in monitoring its own affairs, and by govern-,
ment over business and the community in general. The computers can also
be used by social scientists, of course, to gather the data on which to base the
strategies for determining what type of surveillance may be needed, and at
what points it may usefully be undertaken.
"But," their timorous lay-reader will ask, "who will scrutinize the social
scientists?"
ROBERT H. STERN
Associate Professor of PoliticalScience
State University of New York at Buffalo

